SECURE THE VICTORY: IS IT TIME FOR A STABILIZATION AND RECONSTRUCTION COMMAND?
Take up the White man's burdenAnd reap his old reward: The blame of those ye better, The hate of those ye guard.
-Kipling
Why is the United States Army so reluctant to change? Have past victories made leaders fearful of disrupting a good thing? History is full of examples of military organizations that were victorious one day but defeated the next. The current transformation of the U. S.
Army into a leaner, lethal and more rapid deployable force is impressive. However, is this effort developing the appropriate force to solve the current and future national requirements?
According to Joint Vision 2020, the ultimate goal of the U. S. military is to achieve "full spectrum dominance -the ability of US forces, operating unilaterally or in combination with multinational and interagency partners, to defeat any adversary and control any situation across the full range of military operations." 1 This dominance requires the ability to conduct military operations in both combat and noncombat situations. America's strength -direct combat. This is especially true since the U. S. military appears to find it difficult to defeat opponents that prefer to fight with asymmetric responses. To better fight both types of conflict, a proposal has been made to establish a Stability and Reconstruction Joint Command (S&R JCOM). 3 Considerable debate has occurred whether the S&R JCOM is the proper solution. The purpose of this paper is to review the strategic environment the United
States confronts, discuss the options the nation has in controlling all phases of conflict within this strategic environment, and suggest the benefits that a new force structure including a S&R JCOM would provide the Army in achieving a ready and relevant "full spectrum" force.
STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT
After the overwhelming success of the American-led coalition against Iraq in Operations DESERT STORM and IRAQI FREEDOM, the likelihood that an enemy would challenge the United States in direct combat has decreased significantly. Max Boot, a well known historian of military operations other than war, claims that, "The United States is so far ahead of any rival in all the underlying components of power: economic, military, technological or geopolitical that scholars describe the international scene as unipolor." 4 With the strength of the economy and the rapid advances in technology in American society, the gap between the U. S. military and its nearest competitor seems to be increasing. This gap makes direct combat less likely or at least provides the nation with significant warning of an emerging military competitor. However, technological and economic advantages do not guarantee peace nor do they insure that the United States will not confront enemies that will find other means to attack the nation. Two obvious threats to national interests have emerged.
The first threat is the proliferation and potential use of weapons of mass destruction by rogue states or non-state actors, such as terrorist organizations. According to the National Security Strategy, "... the nature and motivations of these new adversaries, their determination to obtain destructive powers hitherto available only to the world's strongest states, and the greater likelihood that they will use weapons of mass destruction against us, make today's security environment more complex and dangerous." 5 United States nuclear retaliation will not deter such actors because they claim no particular sovereignty and view their cause as a greater concern than the population they supposedly represent. These organizations have also become increasingly more difficult to find and target.
The second threat, terrorist attacks against American and allied citizens, similar to Although much of the world disapproves of such methods, terrorist organizations will continue to use these means to attack the citizens of the United States and their economy that depends on stable markets and world trade. Section IV of the United States National Security Strategy stresses the importance of free markets and free trade to America's prosperity.
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Producing chaos and disrupting international stability hinders American prosperity and therefore provides a potential means to indirectly defeat the United States or at least force America to leave a particular region. To protect the country from these threats within the nation's borders, the current administration created the Department of Homeland Security and expanded its intelligence agencies. What has the military done to meet such threats beyond America's borders?
TRANSFORMATION VERSUS THE EXPECTED THREAT
The military is attempting to transform to meet these threats and develop the forces required for future combat. According to Joint Vision 2020, the goal is "the creation of a force that is dominant across the full spectrum of military operations -persuasive in peace, decisive in war, preeminent in any form of conflict." 8 Therefore, to dominate across the full spectrum of conflict, the Army must always be trained, rapidly deployable, and capable of operating in all four phases of joint campaigns -deter (phase I), seize initiative (phase II), decisive operations (phase III), and transition to civil control (phase IV). These phases exist whether the military operation involves combat or MOOTW. The current transformation programs are designed to produce a modular and more rapidly deployable force. This will greatly improve the U. S.
military's ability to tailor appropriate forces and deliver them into a theater faster. However, will military leaders produce a force trained to operate in both combat and noncombat situations? Much of the dilemma of conducting peace operations and training is the manpower required to execute MOOTW tasks and the differences between these two missions. There is not sufficient time to complete all the peace operation tasks and train at the same time for combat. Warfighting deals with destruction and killing. Peace operations usually focus more on rebuilding, stability, and diplomacy. When combat forces deploy for combat, the opposite effect occurs as 100 percent of the time is spent on improving combat skills. Therefore, if the two missions are incompatible, why is the Army willing to degrade its combat force accomplishing MOOTW tasks?
More detrimental to warfighting skills is the fact that often the soldier does not realize the importance of the tasks he is required to perform. Walsh's survey concluded that the majority of leaders surveyed were "willing to neglect 20 percent of their METL tasks to train for MOOTW tasks." 18 The latter has become so commonplace that leaders feel these skills are more important than combat tasks. This view probably indicates that these soldiers felt they had a greater opportunity to deploy for MOOTW than combat missions, and thus they should train accordingly. This mindset could lead to an unprepared Army for future wars.
Recovery time is also an issue. The survey concluded that "at least 7.5 weeks to 13 weeks as the reconstitution time necessary to recover the training element of readiness." 19 This is time a unit needs to be fully operational in order to conduct its primary combat mission after returning from a deployment. If the same combat unit conducts multiple MOOTW missions, the reconstitution time would most likely increase as a greater percentage of combat trained leaders would have departed the unit since solid combat training had occurred. Lieutenant Colonel Timothy Cherry, in a strategic research paper published in 2000, determined that total time lost to a combat unit's warfighting training was closer to a year after its return from deployment away from home station. As a result, extended peace operations affected the combat proficiency of three units -the recovering unit, the deployed unit, and the unit preparing for deployment.
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Finally, are the soldiers executing the jobs they were recruited for or even trained on during basic training? Soldiers enter the service expecting to defend their nation in combat.
However, the nation is increasingly asking them to conduct peace operations. Lieutenant
Colonel Colleen McGuire's strategic research paper in 2001 stresses the difference, "Soldiers admit that operations in Somalia, Bosnia, and Kosovo were not the life they expected when they joined the Army or graduated from their entrance training into the service. They expected to be ready for battle -not escorting children to school. Many were not trained to handle domestic disputes among foreign civilian populations." In McGuire's paper, a considerable number of former battalion commanders and staff officers believed that training for peace operations negatively impacted combat readiness.
24
Several of the Army's field manuals stress the importance of training to maintain the force capable of deploying to fight the nation's wars. Never can the Army afford not to train and maintain the highest levels of readiness. With a focus towards combat preparedness, would peace operation tasks ever receive sufficient priority in training these tasks sufficiently? Walsh raises the additional point that, "much of the Army doctrine and Joint doctrine indicates that Another reason why combat forces can not maintain the expertise required for peace operations is that not all such operations are the same. FM 100-23 lists three types of peace keeping operations: "support to diplomacy, peacekeeping, and peace enforcement. In simple terms, support to diplomacy seeks to prevent conflict; peacekeeping attempts to maintain the peace; and peace enforcement attempts to establish peace." 45 Because of the unique requirements of each mission, it is unrealistic to believe that combat forces training for war would gain the experience to handle the complexities of these peace operations.
USING THE STABILITY AND RECONSTRUCTION COMMAND
If the military created the S&R JCOM, this new command would receive the mission for all peace operations including phase IV operations in campaigns involving combat. This shift in responsibilities allows combat forces to focus totally on training or executing combat. As Snider states, "The Army's mission for the foreseeable future is as clear as it is daunting: to be prepared simultaneously at both ends of the conflict spectrum -high-intensity power projection operations in regional theater war and constabulary operations of extended duration." 46 This new command would provide strategic leaders the ability to manage both 'ends of the conflict spectrum' and never lose focus of providing the nation a well trained combat force.
Examples of S&R JCOM responsibilities would include the majority of the military forward presence forces. For example, the S&R JCOM would include all units currently in Korea.
These forces would not have the combat power of the 2 nd Infantry Division. However, they would have the capability to rapidly receive and sustain combat forces onto the Korean peninsula should war start. The S&R JCOM mission of deterrence and demonstrating America's resolve would continue to force adversaries to decide whether negotiated settlements peacefully were in their best interests versus facing the combat capabilities of the United States.
Should increased violence become the enemy's choice, then combat forces would rapidly enter into the theater, engage the enemy until successful mission completion and depart the theater to refit for future combat. While in theater, the S&R JCOM would support the joint task force commander by securing lines of supplies and communications, and continue to work with the local population in areas no longer requiring combat forces. When combat forces depart, the S&R JCOM would receive command of the units in the area to continue phase IV and other peace operations. Stability and reconstruction units would remain in theater until either the United Nations assumes command of the rebuilding mission or stability returns to the point that the new government assumes responsibility for its own security efforts. Bradley Graham, a
Washington Post correspondent, notes, "The idea is that the stabilization and reconstruction force would serve as a kind of bridge between the end of major combat operations and the point at which a civilian-led, nation-building effort is up and running...." America preparing these forces for its next adversary? Adjusting force structure to create a unified command with the direct responsibility of post-combat operations seems a more efficient means to prepare for both operations in the future. Homeland defense requirements would also be the responsibility of the S&R JCOM.
IMPLEMENTING THE STABILITY AND RECONSTRUCTION COMMAND
Local National Guard units would handle the majority of these operations, however, the S&R JCOM could reinforce them with active component units if the threat expands. Miles, "At this school, lessons learned could be taught to large number of trainees and doctrine could be established. It is realistic to believe that the UN would also support such a university with skills obtained by other countries." 54 The institute would consolidate expertise from the international community to develop viable solutions to improve noncombat operations.
The institute could also support the development of phase IV military operations plans.
Garten claims that over a period of time the institute will, "... create an institutional cadre of highly skilled and motivated experts, adequately trained and financed, whose careers will be devoted to operating in politically chaotic situations. The American people do not desire to remain in these countries any longer than required, but no one should underestimate the time necessary to establish a transition to stability." 55 The institute would provide senior strategic leaders with more realistic time tables and critical event checklists to better plan exit strategies.
CONCLUSION
America is new to the role of global hegemony. However, being new to this role has not reduced the goals of the United States. According to the National Security Strategy, "... the United States will use this moment of opportunity to extend the benefits of freedom across the globe. We will actively work to bring the hope of democracy, development, free markets, and free trade to every corner of the world." 56 With such an aggressive foreign policy, the military can expect to become involved in numerous regional conflicts as our nation attempts to learn and administer the duties as the global policeman.
History indicates that whatever program America adopts to transform its armed forces, her enemies will react to level the playing field. 2 The use of the US military for missions other than direct combat has led to the creation of many terms that are similar but not exactly alike. Listed below are several of the terms and their definition that are used in this paper and the quoted references:
Constabulary Operations : Term used to describe post-conflict nation-building operations in Japan and Germany after World War II. Military forces were assigned the mission to provide security and law enforcement during the reconstruction process of these two nations.
Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW): "The use of military capabilities across the range of military operations short of war. These military actions can be applied to complement any combination of the other instruments of national power and occur before, during, and after war. 6 Boot, 348. 7 The National Security Strategy makes it clear that, "A strong world economy enhances our national security by advancing prosperity and freedom in the rest of the world. Economic growth supported by free trade and free markets creates new jobs and higher incomes. It allows people to lift their lives out of poverty, spurs economic and legal reform, and the fight against corruption, and it reinforces the habits of liberty.
We will promote economic growth and economic freedom beyond America's shores.... We will use our economic engagement with other countries to underscore the benefits of policies that generate higher productivity and sustained economic growth." Bush, The National Security Strategy of the United States of America, 17. The same study found most leaders felt preparation for MOOTW missions helped the unit but could not cover all the key tasks they would be required to execute. During the MOOTW deployment, combat training was degraded further. The survey showed "more than 60% of the respondents stated that compared to home station the training opportunities while deployed were less to non-existent. Since METL related training is very perishable and must be maintained and sustained, ... this information indicates a much greater training effort is required to achieve full METL capability" Ibid., 12. More often unit training primarily focused on individual skills like weapons qualification, common skills training, and physical fitness. Collective tasks were minimal at best. Degradation of skills was particularly noticeable above the platoon level of operations. Ibid., 13-15. 18 Ibid., 26. LTC Cherry also included a study conducted by the U.S. Center for Army Lessons Learned on the effects of peace operations on combat unit readiness. Time requirements for peace operations go well beyond the actual deployment. Units tend to stop training on their warfighting mission when they are designated for peace operations. This is often from two to six months in advance and usually required up to six months upon return to home station to recover equipment, complete personnel changes, and begin to train back on the normal training cycle. Therefore a combat unit loses a majority of the year beyond the designated deployment period. Deployments affect three units, the deployed unit, the unit returning from deployment, and the unit training as a replacement unit. Also affected are stay-behind units who often must add fillers in personnel and equipment, reducing their combat capabilities. 26 LTC Cherry provides details on the difficulties experienced with the warrior mindset conducting peace operations. He does a great job listing the differences in warfighting tasks versus tasks covered in smaller-scaled contingencies. Cherry, [7] [8] 27 Don M. Snider, "Let the Debate Begin: The Case for a Constabulary Force," Army Magazine, June 1998, 14.
28 Cherry, 11. 29 Their overall conclusions recommended "creating two joint military headquarters to organize units critical to the S&R mission (S&R JCOMs)" and source them with two divisionequivalents of joint assets to execute these missions. Binnendijk, 121. "The first divisionequivalent should be mostly active personnel; the second division-equivalent can include a large component of reserve personnel." Ibid. Each division would "…be flexible, modular, scalable, and rapidly deployable with four brigade sized S&R Groups that include military police, civil affairs, engineers, medical, and PSYOPS supported by a tactical combat capability." Ibid. These forces would be America's experts in coordinating with multi-agency civilian response teams, international organizations, and UN Peacekeeping Forces. Ibid, 122. 32 Many legislators believed "... on the ruins of the U.S.S.R., American defense officials and civilian experts were already talking of the 'strategic pause' and the 'peace dividend' that were supposed to follow that epochal event. Defense budgets dwindled and efficiency became the watchword in the Pentagon and on Capitol Hill." Kagan, 7 . The military's transformation effort was based on "efforts to reduce the defense budget in the 1990s in order to expand the 'peace dividend.' "....The goal was to make the Pentagon more efficient and to use the funds recouped by the efficiency to support transformation." Ibid. Adding to force structure does not reduce costs and therefore the military had a reluctance to ask for additional troops to handle peace operations.
33 Such a proposal, "comes in the face of traditional US Army opposition to the idea of establishing forces focused on peacekeeping. Army officials have argued that combat troops can be used for peacekeeping when necessary and that traditional units with recovery-related skills can be cobbled onto combat divisions to meet postwar demands.... In the past, Army authorities have argued that they do not have enough troops to maintain separate combat and peacekeeping forces. They also have worried that units focused on postwar policing would be viewed as stepchildren of the main Army, leading to morale and performance problems." Graham, "Pentagon Considers Creating Postwar Peacekeeping Forces," 16. 34 LTC McGuire provides an example of how a military police battalion was effectively able to deploy to Kosovo with twelve days of notice. Their training was similar to the situation they faced in Kosovo. Therefore, soldier's morale remained high as they were performing the mission they were trained for. On the other hand, an infantry battalion deploying to the same region was extremely ill prepared and performed poorly in Kosovo. Soldiers were demoralized, confused about their mission, and potentially damaged the political environment they were sent to improve. McGuire, 7-8. 35 Graham, "Pentagon Considers Creating Postwar Peacekeeping Forces," 16. 36 "Without their work, a battlefield triumph may amount to little. Hence the civil affairs motto: 'Secure the Victory'." Boot, 333 . No administration would send service members into combat if they knew the same force would have to return to fight again in the future. Postconflict operations ensure that the political goals achieved by combat remain in place and new methods of government and law enforcement have the opportunity to develop. 37 "In fact occupation duty is generally necessary after a big war in order to impose the victor's will on the vanquished.... Only boots on the ground can guarantee a lasting peace." Boot, 338. Boot also reminds us, by historical example, that claiming victory and departing the area prior to effective change taking place only means you will be required to face the problem again. "Successful state building starts by imposing the rule of law ... as a precondition for economic development and the eventual emergence of democracy. Merely holding an election and leaving is likely to achieve little, as the U.S. discovered in Haiti after 1994." Boot, 346 . 38 Kagan makes a good point why the ground soldier must be present before a nation can successfully end the conflict. "If the enemy knows that all he will face is a barrage of precisionguided munitions, he will find counter-measures -digging too deeply for the weapons to penetrate, jamming or blinding U.S. reconnaissance assets, etc. … This type of warfare was ineffective in the German strategic bombing of Great Britain in World War I and II and the strategic bombing campaigns of North Vietnam." Kagan, [15] [16] . Ground forces restore the peace over a country that has seen its government and military overthrown. "Even in Afghanistan, Bosnia, and Kosovo, ground forces or the threat of their use played the decisive role in bringing the enemy to surrender." Ibid., 16. This has worked in the past and little seems to have changed in human conditioning to think this phenomenon will change anytime soon. "...
[O]nly ground forces can execute the peacemaking, peacekeeping, and reconstruction activities that have been essential to success in most of the wars America has fought in the past hundred years." Ibid., 16. There are other manuals that provide information on these topics, however, these two specifically focus on the differences in peace operations (peacekeeping vs. peace enforcement), stability requirements (such as dealing with insurgencies, handling displaced civilians, terrorism, and establishing humanitarian operations), and reconstruction (reestablishing law, creating judicial means to support law enforcement, military-civil affairs, coordinating with international actors, establishing legitimacy to new local governments, and transfer of power to that government).
Winning the Peace Act, a bill developed by the House of Representatives provides key skill sets that the nation's strategic leaders believe are important to stability and reconstruction operations. "Any person involved in reconstruction efforts of such a state must have extensive cross-cultural training and the ability to communicate effectively in the language of that state....Reconstruction Services include security and public safety, establishing justice systems, establishing governance and participation, and economic and social well-being." United States Congress, House of Representatives Bill, Winning the Peace Act of , 108th Congress, 1st Session, May 16, 2003 . 42 Boot stresses the importance of American resolve if the nation ever expects to influence change in small-scale contingencies. "Short-term occupations ... are unlikely to fundamentally alter the nature of a society." Boot, 345 . He claims if the country's support is strong enough to get involved in the conflict, then support should remain even if casualties occur. This resolve tends to make Americans less of a target. "If foreign enemies know that killing a few Americans will drive the U.S. out of their country, they are far more likely to target American soldiers or civilians." Ibid., 328. 43 Peace operations deal with getting the population to establish trust in the military presence. Max Boot provides a great example where United States forces missed the point. "In the aftermath of the bombing campaign, a multinational peacekeeping force was sent to occupy Kosovo, including a U.S. contingent .... [the] U.S. Army risk-adverse mentality impeded attempts to establish a durable peace. American troopers seldom ventured outside their fortified compound, Camp Bondsteel, with wearing their forbidding "battle rattle" -body armor, Kevlar helmets, the works. This impeded their ability to interact with local civilians, gather intelligence, and spread goodwill -prerequisites for a successful occupation. British soldiers, by contrast, looked more confident and approachable in their berets and rolled-up sleeves." Boot, 327. Boot raises another point when considering risk and casualty avoidance. "No one expects a big city police department to win the 'war on crime.' The police are considered successful if they reduce disorder, keep the criminal element at bay, and allow decent people a chance to live their lives in peace. In the process a few cops are likely to die, and while this is a tragedy to be mourned, no one suggests that as a result the police should go home and leave gangsters to run the streets." Ibid., 346. It is therefore imperative that police forces are formed, trained, and supervised to control local crime. However, until this force is created, crime reduction and citizen security is a critical mission of the stability and reconstruction force. 49 This "... new force would have its own headquarters to help ensure postwar operations are not overlooked in prewar planning." Graham, "Pentagon Considers Creating Postwar Peacekeeping Forces," 16. Just as stability and reconstruction force structure covers the current inefficient post-conflict operations, so will the S&R JCOM headquarters ensuring all plans have adequate details during phase IV of the operation. 50 Binnendijk, 39-84. Binndedijk and Johnson propose the transformation of the military to create units with the specific focus on S&R missions. These forces would having two joint commands (S&R JCOMs) with one primarily in the active component directing current S&R operations while a second (primarily reserve component) organizing and coordinating future and follow-on S&R operations. The military could deploy S&R forces to provide a forward presence and allow the enemy the opportunity to negotiate a settlement prior to United States sending combat units into the region. Along with being a visable deterrent, S&R forces would establish logisitics bases that may provide combat forces an early advantage should they be forced to deploy into the theater.
Their proposal used historical and Rand Corporation studies to determine the number of peace operations the United States could expect in the future and therefore design a force capable of executing all these missions without requesting support from combat forces. Their research determined the two active duty divisions force (roughly 18,000 soldiers each) was the best sized force to handle expected contingencies with little or no increase to end strength. "... a brigade-sized force is a bare minimum but will be too small if tomorrow's world is as turbulent as today's. A corps-sized force is close to ideal, but may be more than the traffic would bear. A two division-equivalent force would provide a solid range of capabilities and a relatively high level of insurance, including a capacity for medium S& R missions in two major theaters of war." Ibid., 51.
